管理层权力、并购效率与股价崩盘风险  

Management Power,M&A Efficiency,and Stock Market Crash Risk

作　　者：邹燕[1] 李梦晓 孟欣 张琳慧 Zou Yan;Li Mengxiao;Meng Xin;Zhang Linhui

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学会计学院 [2]青岛海尔智家股份有限公司

出　　处：《财经科学》2021年第6期26-39,共14页Finance & Economics

摘　　要：本文聚焦中国A股上市公司,取2007—2016年为主要的窗口期间,通过样本研究,对管理层权力与股价崩盘风险的关系进行实证检验。进一步地,本文以商誉及对应的商誉减值构建并购效率的衡量指标,将其作为调节变量对管理层权力与股价崩盘风险的关系进行深度探讨。通过模型构建、回归与分组统计,本文得到三个方面的结论。第一,管理层权力的增大对股价崩盘风险具有正向推动作用;第二,上市公司高溢价确认商誉后又大额计提减值,会降低并购效率,进而触发股价崩盘风险;第三,并购效率的提高,会使管理层权力与股价崩盘风险正相关的显著性得以抑制。Taking all A-share listed companies in stock exchanges from 2007 to 2016 as samples,this paper empirically tested the relationship between management power and stock price crash risk.Further,this paper constructed and studied the impact of merger efficiency on the above relationship creatively.The results show that,first,management power is positively correlated with the risk of stock price crash,that is,the greater the power of management,the higher the risk of stock price crash.Secondly,the higher the efficiency of merger and acquisition,the lower the risk of stock price crash.Third,the higher the efficiency of merger and acquisition,the less significant the positive correlation between management power and stock price crash risk.

关 键 词：管理层权力 并购效率 股票崩盘风险 商誉 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]