混合寡占竞争、环境税与企业减排研发的关系研究  

Research on the Relationship between Mixed Oligopolistic Competition,Environmental Taxes and Corporate Emission Reduction R&D

作　　者：黎巧粉 LI Qiaofen(Business School,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815,China)

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学商学院,南京211815

出　　处：《中国资源综合利用》2021年第7期144-147,153,共5页China Resources Comprehensive Utilization

摘　　要：通过建立一个三阶段混合寡占博弈模型,本文研究了环境破坏系数、溢出程度、研发效率对政府最优环境税税率的影响。研究发现,当环境破坏系数较小、溢出程度较大且创新效率居中时,政府的最优环境税税率随着环境破坏系数的增大而减小,在其他情况下,政府的最优环境税税率随着环境破坏系数的增大而增大;当创新效率较高时,政府最优环境税税率随着溢出程度的增加而增加,创新效率较低时,政府最优环境税税率随着溢出程度的增加而减少。By establishing a three-stage mixed oligopoly game model,this paper studies the influence of environmental damage coefficient,spillover degree,and research and development(R&D)efficiency on the government’s optimal environmental tax rate.The study finds that when the environmental damage coefficient is small,the spillover degree is large,and the innovation efficiency is in the middle,the government’s optimal environmental tax rate decreases with the increase of the environmental damage coefficient,in other cases,the government’s optimal environmental tax rate increases as the environmental damage coefficient increases;when the innovation efficiency is high,the government’s optimal environmental tax rate increases with the degree of spillover,and when the innovation efficiency is low,the government’s optimal environmental tax rate decreases with the degree of spillover.

关 键 词：环境税 减排研发 国有企业 混合寡占 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]