政府补贴消费者情形下最优利润模型  

Optimal Profit Giving Model in the Case of Government Subsidies to Consumer

作　　者：王婷婷 陆媛媛[1] WANG Tingting;LU yuanyuan(School of Mathematics,Jilin Normal University,Siping 136000,China)

机构地区：[1]吉林师范大学数学学院,吉林四平136000

出　　处：《牡丹江师范学院学报（自然科学版）》2021年第3期9-13,共5页Journal of Mudanjiang Normal University：Natural Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71501082)。

摘　　要：采用逆向归纳法确定产品的绿色度、批发价、零售价和政府补贴,构建以三级绿色供应链为背景的最优利润模型,实现最大利润函数和最优社会福利函数.以政府补贴消费者情况下,制造商与零售商均无公平偏好(公平中性)的Stackelberg博弈模型表明,政府的补贴将刺激消费者的购买欲望从而增加销量.通过模型可以预估零售商、制造商的最大利润及政府的最大社会福利.Constructed an optimal profit model with a three-level green supply chain as the background.Use reverse induction to determine the product's greenness,wholesale price,retail price,and government subsidies to achieve the largest profit function and optimal social welfare function.A Stackelberg game model is established when the government subsidizes consumers and neither manufacturer nor retailer has a fairness preference(fairness and neutrality).The results of the study show that government subsidies will stimulate consumers desire to buy and increase sales,through calculations,the maximum profit of retailers and manufacturers and the maximum social welfare of the government can be obtained.

关 键 词：政府补贴 公平中性 绿色供应链 博弈模型 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]