政府监管机制下农产品质量安全生产三方演化博弈研究  

Research on the Three-party Evolutionary Game of Safe Quality Production of Agricultural Products under Government Supervision Mechanism

作　　者：彭雪 王福林[1] 王佳丽 PENG Xue;WANG Fu-lin;WANG Jia-li(College of Engineering,Northeast Agricultural University,Harbin 150030,China)

机构地区：[1]东北农业大学工程学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150030

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2021年第14期114-126,共13页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目:农民合作社主导的农产品供应链系统构建、利益协调与引导策略研究(19BJY169)。

摘　　要：作为农业大国,我国农产品的质量安全关乎国计民生和经济发展.利用演化博弈法构建了农产品生产企业、第三方农产品质检机构和政府监管部门三个主体之间利益互动关系的演化博弈模型,确定了影响各主体决策的关键因素,并利用MATLAB软件进行数值仿真验证了演化稳定性分析的有效性,最后为政府完善农产品质量安全生产监管机制提出了合理建议.As a large agricultural country,the quality of agricultural products in China is related to people’s livelihood and economic development.This paper uses the evolutionary game method to construct an evolutionary game model for the interaction of interests among three subjects of the agricultural product manufacturer,the third-party agricultural product quality inspection agency,and the government regulatory department.This paper determines the key factors that affect the decision-making of each game participant,and carries out numerical simulation experiments with MATLAB software to verify the effectiveness of the evolutionary stability analysis.Finally,the study puts forward reasonable suggestions for the government to improve the supervision mechanism for high-quality production of agricultural products.

关 键 词：农产品 质量安全监管 三方演化博弈 数值仿真分析 

分 类 号：F322[经济管理—产业经济]