制度约束下的风险与激励——基于近代东北农地租佃契约的理论与实证研究  

Risk and Incentives under Institutional Constraints:Theoretical and Empirical Research Based on Land Tenancy Contracts in Modern Northeast China

作　　者：黄天宇 李楠 韦潇 Huang Tianyu;Li Nan;Wei Xiao(Department of Economics,Fudan University)

机构地区：[1]复旦大学经济学院,上海200433

出　　处：《经济科学》2021年第4期130-143,共14页Economic Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“贸易、疾病与经济发展:基于近代中国流行性鼠疫空间扩散的理论及实证研究”(项目编号:71773070);复旦大学理论经济学Ⅰ类高峰计划项目“整治整合、民族认同与经济发展:基于中国历史经验的理论与实证研究”的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：风险与激励的关系一直是契约理论的重要内容。本文在经典理论框架(Holmstrom和Milgrom,1987)的基础上,根据农业实践引入契约类型选择的制度限制,分析风险对最优租佃契约形式以及激励的影响,并且利用民国时期东北地区的微观契约数据进行实证检验。结果发现,灾害风险越大,分成契约被选择的概率越大(激励越小);同时无论选择的是分成还是定额契约,地租率都会越小(激励越大)。此外,当佃农的财富增加或者使用受灾害影响更小的土地时,风险对契约选择的影响可以被减轻。本文的分析为风险与激励关系文献中相互矛盾的实证发现提供了一种可能的解释。The relationship between risk and incentives is of importance in the contract theory.In this paper,we introduce contract-type constraints into the classical framework of Holmstrom&Milgrom(1987)according to agricultural practices to analyze the influences of such constraints on the optimal contract tenancy form and incentives.We then empirically investigate the predictions of our model by employing the micro-level data of the 1930 s in Northeast China.We find that when the level of risk of disasters is higher,(1)the share contract is more likely to be chosen(incentives are weaker);and(2)the rent rates of both share and fixed-rent contracts are lower(incentives are stronger).In addition,such effects would be mitigated if the tenant farmer has more wealth or the quality of the contracted land is higher.This paper provides an alternative explanation for the controversy about the relationship between risk and incentives in the literature.

关 键 词：土地租佃 契约理论 风险与激励 契约类型约束 

分 类 号：F016[经济管理—政治经济学] F129