国际制度复合性何以走向分散化  

Why International Institution Complexity Goes to Fragmentation

作　　者：卓晔 Zhuo Ye(School of Public Administration,Jilin University)

机构地区：[1]吉林大学行政学院,长春130012

出　　处：《世界经济与政治》2021年第7期104-126,159,160,共25页World Economics and Politics

摘　　要：国际制度间的重叠在国际关系实践中屡见不鲜,国际制度复合性也由此成为国际制度间关系的重要内容,即同一议题领域内功能重叠、非等级制且拥有部分相同成员的国际制度集合而形成的全球治理系统。由于在总体制度设定构造上缺乏统一目标,分散化成了国际制度复合性的基本特征和可能走向,这影响了未来国际制度的发展方向,针对国际制度复合性分散化的研究应运而生。现有研究在分析探究国际制度复合性分散化的原因时存在归因单一、缺少系统性分析的缺陷。为克服这种不足,可采用交易成本视角,以系统性思维结合国际制度复合性中的构造性特征、单元国家和要素制度,将国际制度复合性分散化归因于国际制度复合性中存在交易成本,即参与国家和要素制度受制于国际制度复合性构造而产生的外部性成本。作者采用关键案例中最小可能案例的研究方法,选取清迈倡议框架下2000—2008年的东亚货币合作制度作为国际制度复合性的个案,发现这一时期的东亚货币合作制度在构造上存在着挂钩分歧、意图错位和互换额较低等特征构成的交易成本,从而导致该制度复合性的分散化。It is obviously common that international institutions overlap in international affairs,which brings about institution complexity,namely a system of global governance induced by a set of functionally overlapping and nonhierarchical international institutions with partially same members.Within institution complexity,fragmentation,which means no core goal in the overall setting or architecture of institution complexity,not only becomes a cure for institutional overreach and competition,but also shapes the architecture of international institutions.For previous research on the origination of fragmentation within institution complexity,there exist defects including lack of systemic analysis.This paper adopts a transaction cost approach,and attributes the fragmentation to transaction cost,namely the negative externality from architecture of institution complexity including bounded rationality,opportunism and assert specificity.Following the principle of the least-likely cases,this paper chooses the currency cooperation in East Asia(2000-2008)as a crucial case of institution complexity.It shows that transaction cost within the complexity induces the fragmentation of institution complexity.

关 键 词：国际制度复合性 分散化 交易成本 清迈倡议 东亚货币合作 

分 类 号：D815[政治法律—国际关系]