政府奖惩机制对闭环供应链制造商合作策略影响  

The Effects of Premium and Penalty Mechanism on Manufacturer’s Cooperative Strategies in the Closed-loop Supply Chain

作　　者：石纯来 崔春晖 胡培[2] 张宗明[1] Shi Chunlai;Cui Chunhui;Hu Pei;Zhang Zongming(School of Economics and Management,Xidian University,Xi’an 710126;School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031)

机构地区：[1]西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院,西安710126 [2]西南交通大学经济管理学院,成都610031

出　　处：《管理评论》2021年第7期282-289,共8页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71672153,71502132);四川省教育厅人文社会科学重点研究基地马铃薯主粮化战略研究中心重点项目(MLS1702);四川省社会科学重点研究基地四川省电子商务与现代物流研究中心课题(DSWL16-6);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2018M631126)。

摘　　要：存在第三方回收商的闭环供应链中,研究政府奖惩机制如何影响制造商合作决策。构建了制造商仅与零售商(回收商)合作、与零售商和回收商都合作及均不合作四种策略。研究发现:制造商存在正向合作和逆向合作的动机。在各策略中,供应链成员均合作时供应链利润最高,均不合作时最低。但不同合作方向中供应链利润大小与政府奖惩力度以及旧产品回收效率有关。若政府奖惩力度较小,正向合作中供应链利润高于逆向合作;若政府奖惩力度较大,当回收效率较低时,正向合作中供应链利润高于逆向合作;反之,则相反。此外,无论正向合作还是逆向合作均增加消费者剩余和社会福利。This paper studies the impact of government’s premium and penalty mechanism on the cooperation strategies of the manufacturer in closed-loop supply chain(CLSC).We construct four cooperative models based on game theory:no cooperation mode(model N),cooperation only with the recycler(model MC),cooperation only with the retailer(model MR),and cooperation with both the retailer and the recycler(model MCR).The results show that the manufacturer has both incentives for cooperation with the retailer and incentives for cooperation with the recycler.Under different cooperation strategies,the supply chain has the highest profit when the manufacturer cooperates with the retailer and the recycler,and the total profit of supply chain is lowest when the three have no cooperation with each other.However,whether the supply chain profit under the manufacturer-retailer partnership is higher than that under the manufacturer-recycler partnership is associated with the potency dimension of government’s rewards and punishments and the recycling efficiency of old products.If the government’s rewards and punishments are small,the supply chain has the higher profit when the manufacturer only cooperates with the retailer;If the government rewards and punishments are large,the supply chain has the higher profit under the manufacturer-retailer partnership than under the manufacturer-recycler partnership when the recycling efficiency is low,but the supply chain has the higher profit under the manufacturer-recycler partnership than under the manufacturer-retailer partnership when the recycling efficiency is high.Besides,the manufacturer choosing to partner with the retailer or the recycler can always increase consumer surplus and social welfare.

关 键 词：奖惩机制 闭环供应链 合作策略 回收效率 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学] F274[政治法律—中外政治制度]