基于博弈论的空铁联运收益分配模型  

Revenue Distribution Models of Air-rail Intermodal Transport Based on Game Theory

作　　者：马继辉[1] 王瀛帜 姜秀山[1] 卫亮 MA Ji-hui;WANG Ying-zhi;JIANG Xiu-shan;WEI Liang(School of Traffic and Transportation,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China)

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学交通运输学院,北京100044

出　　处：《交通运输系统工程与信息》2021年第4期23-29,共7页Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金联合基金(U2034208)。

摘　　要：理想的空铁联运收益分配方式是实现航空与高铁深度合作的重要条件。本文考虑旅客对空铁联运服务水平和价格的敏感度等影响因素,根据空铁联运的实际运营情况,探究通过收益共享合同协调航空和高铁的利益冲突,形成理想的收益分配方式并促进空铁联运的发展。基于不同的合作水平,使用纳什议价效用函数模拟议价过程,建立航空主导的和具有议价行为的收益共享博弈模型,采用逆向归纳法对博弈模型进行求解。为验证收益共享合同模式的有效性,与分散决策和集中控制两种博弈模型结果进行比较,并选择北京-石家庄-广州空铁联运产品进行数值实验。结果表明,在收益共享合同模式下,联运产品的服务水平和整体盈利能力得到有效提升,高铁获得的共享收益比例与旅客对联运产品服务水平需求弹性正相关,议价行为可以使联运产品的服务水平和总体利润更高更稳定,有利于实现空铁联运的理想运营状态。The ideal revenue distribution is important to promote the deep cooperation between air transport and highspeed rail transport.Given the actual situation of air-rail intermodal transport,this paper considered passengers’sensitivity to the service level,the price,and other critical factors.The paper examined whether the revenue-sharing contract can set incentives,coordinate the conflict of interest between air transport and high-speed rail transport,derive an ideal revenue distribution method,and promote the development of air-rail intermodal transport.Based on different cooperation levels,the Nash bargaining utility function was used to simulate the bargaining process,the revenuesharing game models dominated by aviation and the bargaining behavior were also established.The game models were solved by the inverse induction method.The study selected Beijing-Shijiazhuang-Guangzhou air-rail intermodal product for the numerical experiment and compared the equilibrium solutions of decentralized decision and centralized control game models to verify the effectiveness of the revenue-sharing contract.The results indicate that the model effectively improved the service level and overall profitability of the intermodal product under the revenue-sharing contract.The revenue-sharing proportion by high-speed rail is positively correlated with passengers’sensitivity to the service level.Bargaining behavior can make the service level and overall profit of the intermodal product higher and more stable,which can be applied to achieve the ideal state of the intermodal product.

关 键 词：综合运输 空铁联运 收益共享合同 博弈模型 逆向归纳法 

分 类 号：U268.6[机械工程—车辆工程]