基于改进复制动态方程的邻避事件随机演化博弈模型  

Stochastic Evolutionary Game Model of NIMBY Events Based on Improved Repetitive Dynamic Equations

作　　者：徐松鹤[1] 胡少龙 韩传峰[3] XU Song-he;HU Shao-long;HAN Chuan-feng(College of Economics and Management,Zhejiang Normal University,Jinhua 321004,China;College of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 614202,China;School of Economics and Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江师范大学经济与管理学院,浙江金华321004 [2]西南交通大学经济与管理学院,四川成都614202 [3]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2021年第15期1-12,共12页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71704162,71701187);教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(17YJC630184)。

摘　　要：明晰邻避事件相关主体的行为机理,是把握邻避事件演化规律,破解邻避困境的关键.考虑到群体"示范效应"带来的策略间依存关系,引入激励系数改进传统复制动态方程,并引入高斯白噪声来刻画邻避事件演化过程中受到的随机扰动,构建不确定环境下邻避事件的随机演化博弈模型.研究发现,同一群体内部的影响力更强的策略收敛速度更快,但影响力超过一定阈值时,博弈演化均衡会发生改变;随机扰动影响下,公众群体演化路径的波动幅度大于政府群体演化路径的波动幅度;且公众群体策略演化至均衡的速度更快.Clarifying the behavior mechanism of stakeholders related to the NIMBY event is the key to grasping the evolution law of the NIMBY event and solving the NIMBY dilemma.Considering the inter-strategy dependence caused by the "demonstration effect" of the group,this paper introduces the excitation coefficient to improve the traditional replication dynamic equation,and introduces Gaussian white noise to describe the random disturbances in the evolution process of the NIMBY event.Finally,a stochastic evolutionary game model in an uncertain environment is constructed.The study found that strategies with stronger influence within the same group converge faster.When the influence exceeds a certain threshold,the equilibrium of the game evolution will change.Under the influence of random disturbances,the fluctuation of the public group’s evolution path is greater than that of the government.In addition,public group strategies evolved to equilibrium faster than the government.

关 键 词：邻避 改进复制动态方程 策略依存性 随机演化博弈 扰动 

分 类 号：D631.43[政治法律—政治学] O225[政治法律—中外政治制度]