发债主体长期信用评级质量对审计收费的影响  

The Influence of the Long-term Credit Rating Quality of Bond Issuers on Audit Fees

作　　者：汪要文 WANG Yao-wen(School of Business,Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics,Zhengzhou 450015,China)

机构地区：[1]郑州航空工业管理学院商学院,河南郑州450015

出　　处：《税务与经济》2021年第4期93-99,共7页Taxation and Economy

基　　金：河南省软科学计划基金项目(项目编号:202400410380)。

摘　　要：不同收费模式下发债主体的长期信用评级质量对审计收费存在一定的影响,发行人付费模式的评级虚高越严重,评级质量相对越低,审计收费相应越低,这与利益冲突理论一致,此种现象在国内主要评级机构中普遍存在。从具体作用机制来看,评级质量影响审计收费的机制可能有公司治理效应和信息效应,外部独立董事占比和国有产权的公司治理具有显著的强化利益冲突作用,信息效应的影响却并不显著。因此,我国政府监管部门可以适当引导规范评级机构,强化对发行人付费模式评级机构的信息质量监管,约束其利益冲突。The quality of long-term credit ratings of bond issuers under different fee models has a certain impact on audit fees.The more serious the rating of the issuer’s payment model,the lower the rating quality is,and the relatively lower the audit fees are.This is in line with the theory of interest conflict.This phenomenon is widespread among major domestic rating agencies.From the perspective of specific mechanism,the impact of rating quality on audit fees is due to the corporate governance effects and information effects.The proportion of external independent directors and the corporate governance of state-owned property rights play a significant role in strengthening conflicts of interest,but the impact of information effects is not significant.Therefore,the government regulatory agencies in China can appropriately guide and standardize rating agencies,and strengthen the information quality supervision of rating agencies of issuer payment model in order to restrain their conflicts of interest.

关 键 词：评级质量 审计收费 利益冲突 公司治理 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]