GOST的差分故障攻击  

Differential Fault Attack on GOST

作　　者：谢敏[1,2] 李嘉琪 田峰 XIE Min;LI Jia-Qi;TIAN Feng(State Key Laboratory of Integrated Services Networks,Xidian University,Xi’an 710071,China;Shaanxi Key Laboratory of Blockchain and Secure Computing,Xi’an 710071,China)

机构地区：[1]西安电子科技大学综合业务网理论及关键技术国家重点实验室,西安710071 [2]陕西省区块链与安全计算重点实验室,西安710071

出　　处：《密码学报》2021年第4期630-639,共10页Journal of Cryptologic Research

基　　金：国家重点研发计划(2018YFE0126000);国家自然科学基金(62072359);陕西省自然科学基础研究计划(2021JM-126);陕西省重点研发计划(2019ZDLGY13-04)。

摘　　要：为了评估俄罗斯标准密码算法GOST的安全性,提出并讨论了一种针对GOST算法的差分故障分析方法.该方法采用单字节随机故障模型,利用模加运算部件的特点获取S盒的输入差分信息,并基于S盒差分分布统计规律实现密钥恢复.实验结果表明,平均7.46次故障引入可以恢复256比特主密钥,12次故障内完成恢复的实验占比达98%,该方法可以有效地攻击GOST算法.In order to evaluate the security of the lightweight block cipher GOST,a differential fault analysis method is proposed and discussed using a single byte random fault model.In this method,the input differential information of S-box is obtained by using the characteristics of modular addition unit,and the key recovery is realized based on the statistical characteristics of S-box difference distribution.The experimental results show that the 256-bit master key can be recovered with an average of 7.46 fault injections,and 98%of the experiments are completed within 12 fault injections.This attack is effective on GOST.

关 键 词：GOST算法 模加运算部件 差分故障分析 单字节故障模型 

分 类 号：TP309.7[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]