受压迫股东的救济路径研究:股东受信义务与法定压迫救济制度  

Approaches to Oppression Remedies for Shareholders:Fiduciary Duties and Statutory Remedies

作　　者：翁小川 Weng Xiaochuan

机构地区：[1]澳大利亚新南威尔士大学法学院

出　　处：《比较法研究》2021年第4期187-200,共14页Journal of Comparative Law

摘　　要：股东保护机制是公司法的核心问题之一。由于公司所有权结构的特点,股东之间的压迫问题已成为公司管理中的重要考量。我国公司法第20条原则性地提出了对股东不得滥用权利的要求。基于该原则建立具体的股东压迫救济制度已成为公司法研究和修订中非常重要的议题,也将对提升我国的营商环境大有帮助。股东受信义务和法定压迫救济制度是国际上较为常见的两大受压迫股东的救济途径。通过比较这两大救济制度的理论与实践,斟酌利弊,深入研究两大制度间的关系及分析域外司法实践的判例,可以为我国建立受压迫股东救济制度提供可行的参考路径。The core question of corporate law is to establish a mechanism to protect shareholders.The oppression among shareholders,caused by ownership structure,has become a major concern for corporate governance.Though it is provided in principle in Article 20 of Company Law of PRC that shareholders shall not abuse their powers,what is more important for the study and revision of the corporate law is to provide specific oppression remedies,which will improve the business environment in China.At present,two major oppression remedies exist internationally:statutory oppression remedies and shareholder’s fiduciary duties.By comparing the two approaches in theory and practice,weighing their pros and cons,and looking deep into their connection and the relevant precedents in judicial practice at abroad,this paper purports to provide a feasible path planning for oppression remedies in China.It is suggested that in China a bi-centric remedial mechanism can be established to improve shareholder protection.

关 键 词：股东保护 受信义务 压迫救济 发展路径选择 

分 类 号：D922.291.91[政治法律—经济法学]