强扭的瓜不一定不甜:纵向干预在横向政府间合作过程中的作用  

Mandate Is Also Effective: The Role of Hierarchical Intervention in the Process of Interlocal Collaboration

作　　者：邢华[1] 邢普耀 Xing Hua;Xing Puyao(School of Government,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing)

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学政府管理学院

出　　处：《经济社会体制比较》2021年第4期84-94,共11页Comparative Economic & Social Systems

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目“跨域合作治理中的府际关系研究”(项目编号:16BZZ077);中央财经大学一流学科建设项目“新一轮科技革命下城市精细化管理研究”(项目编号:CUFF2018-5)。

摘　　要：在地方政府间合作治理研究中,制度性集体行动是近年来常用的分析框架。然而,已有研究缺乏对于强制性机制的运行及其对自组织合作影响的讨论。文章根据已有理论和分析框架提出了三个命题:纵向政府可以运用权威型干预和信息型干预缓解协调问题,以促进横向政府间合作倾向的产生;纵向政府可以运用激励型干预和权威型干预缓解分配问题和背信问题,以促进横向政府间合作的达成与执行;纵向政府可以增进横向政府间的信任和共同价值,促进自组织合作的产生。对新安江流域生态补偿的案例分析印证了上述三个命题。文章有助于深入理解我国地方政府间合作治理的形成机制,对于如何更好地发挥纵向政府的作用有借鉴意义。Institutional Collective Action is a standard analysis framework in interlocal collaboration. However, research on the operational mechanisms of mandate collaboration and its impact on self-organized is still limited. We propose three propositions. Hierarchical governments can use authority-based and information-based interventions to alleviate coordination problems in order to promote a tendency towards interlocal collaboration;hierarchical governments can use incentive-based and authority-based interventions to alleviate division and defection problems to facilitate the formation and implementation of interlocal collaboration;hierarchical governments can promote trust and shared values among horizontal governments to facilitate the emergence of self-organized collaboration. The case study of eco-compensation in the Xin’an River verifies these three propositions. This article contributes to an in-depth understanding of the formation mechanism of interlocal collaboration in China and has implications for how to play the role of hierarchical governments better.

关 键 词：纵向干预 地方政府间合作 制度性集体行动 强制性机制 

分 类 号：D621.5[政治法律—政治学] X321[政治法律—中外政治制度]