Excess Benefit Allocation in Shared Savings Based on Non-cooperative Game Theory  

作　　者：Xiao Xu 

机构地区：[1]Jinan Engineering Vocational Technical College,Jinan 250200,Shandong Province,China

出　　处：《Proceedings of Business and Economic Studies》2021年第4期36-42,共7页商业经济研究（百图）

摘　　要：Energy saving income distribution mode is of great significance to the energy industry.With the continuous application of new technologies,the problem of excess energy saving income distribution has become one of the obstacles to the appreciation of energy performance.At present,the distribution of risk and income is mainly based on the contribution of risk and income,which has some limitations.The benefit distribution of energy saving negotiation between energy saving service companies and clients can be regarded as a bargaining process where an effective range satisfying both parties can be obtained.This provides a new perspective in solving the problem of excess energy saving income distribution in energy management contract projects.

关 键 词：Contract energy management Excess energy saving Non-cooperative game theory Bargaining model 

分 类 号：F12[经济管理—世界经济]