政府规制下废旧品正规与非正规回收群体的三方演化博弈研究  

A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Study on the Formal and Informal Recycling Groups of Waste Products under Government Regulation

作　　者：王建华[1] 李富华 WANG Jianhua;LI Fuhua(School of Management,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China)

机构地区：[1]江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《物流科技》2021年第9期51-57,共7页Logistics Sci-Tech

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71673118)。

摘　　要：针对当前资源浪费和环境污染问题日益凸显而废旧品回收机制不健全的现状,对市场正规和非正规回收群体的激励与制约机制进行探究,分析政府部门对两类回收群体策略选择的影响,构建政府部门、正规和非正规回收群体这三方演化博弈模型,利用数值仿真分析三个主体采取对应策略的演化趋势,以此判断政府部门采取不同策略时对于两类回收群体策略选择的影响。结果表明,影响系统演化至理想状态的因素包括政府部门对非正规回收群体转型升级的补贴、非正规回收群体转型升级策略时的收益、非正规回收群体从正规回收群体获得的技术溢出收益。In view of the increasingly prominent problems of resource waste and environmental pollution and the incomplete recycling mechanism of waste products,we will explore the incentive and restriction mechanism of the formal and informal recycling groups in the market,and analyze the influence of government departments on the strategic choices of the two types of recycling groups.The three-party evolutionary game model of government departments,formal and informal recycling groups uses numerical simulation to analyze the evolution trend of the corresponding strategies adopted by the three subjects,so as to judge the influence of the two types of recycling groups when the government departments adopt different strategies.The results show that the factors that affect the evolution of the system to the ideal state include government subsidies for the transformation and upgrading of informal recycling groups,the benefits of the transformation and upgrading strategies of informal recycling groups,the technology spillover benefits that informal recycling groups obtain from formal recycling groups.

关 键 词：废旧品回收处理 三方演化博弈 演化稳定策略 数值仿真 

分 类 号：F713.2[经济管理—产业经济]