论企业专利侵权诉讼中的多重博弈结构与行为选择  

Discussion on Multiple Game Structure and Behavior Selection in Enterprise Patent Infringement Litigation

作　　者：彭祥飞 PENG Xiangfei(Shanghai International Intellectual Property Institute,Tongji University)

机构地区：[1]同济大学上海国际知识产权学院

出　　处：《商展经济》2021年第17期76-78,共3页Trade Fair Economy

摘　　要：目前在我国的专利侵权诉讼制度中,专利侵权诉讼存在被滥用的风险。滥诉方、遭受滥诉的企业、法院作为个体单元,共同构成复杂诉讼关系的连接点,三者的关系呈现为一种复合博弈结构,正是这种结构下的多重博弈关系影响着诉讼中个体的策略选择。法院对专利侵权诉讼滥用行为规制的缺失,构成了对专利侵权诉讼滥用现象的多重诱导,导致当事人双方诉讼利益的失衡,专利侵权诉讼被异化为打击竞争对手、牟取不当利益的工具。In China's current patent infringement litigation system,there is a risk of abuse of patent infringement litigation.The abuser of litigation,the enterprise suffering from abusive litigation,and the court as individual units constitute the connection point of the complex litigation relationship.The relationship between the three appears as a compound game structure.It is the multiple game relationship under this structure that affects individual strategic choices in the litigation.The lack of the court's regulation of abusive behavior in patent infringement litigation constitutes multiple inducements to the abuse of patent infringement litigation,leading to an imbalance in the litigation interests of both parties,and patent infringement litigation has been alienated as a tool to combat competitors and seek improper benefi ts.

关 键 词：专利侵权诉讼 诉讼滥用 多重博弈 行为选择 滥诉治理 

分 类 号：F425[经济管理—产业经济]