基于合作博弈的时鲜产品网络零售运营策略研究  

The Operations Management of Fresh Product′s Online Retailing Based on the Cooperative Game Theory

作　　者：罗春林[1] 喻冬冬 王彪 朱莹 LUO Chunlin;YU Dongdong;WANG Biao;ZHU Ying(School of Information Management,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang Jiangxi 330013,China)

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学信息管理学院,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《江西师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2021年第3期278-284,共7页Journal of Jiangxi Normal University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71862014,71761015);江西省自然科学基金(20202BABL201012)资助项目.

摘　　要：现代电子商务与物流使得消费异地时鲜产品非常便利,该文基于广义Nash讨价还价的合作博弈理论研究了时鲜产品的网络零售运营策略,包括在网络电商平台销售和平台自营模式下时鲜产品的定价订货与企业绩效等问题.研究结果表明:时鲜产品的批发价和零售价都随时鲜产品新鲜度的增加而增加,但批发价独立于电商平台的佣金比例,而零售价却随佣金比例的增加而增加;零售商的订货量会随佣金比例的增加而减少,却随其讨价还价能力的增加而增加;零售商与供应商的利润比取决于时鲜产品的价格弹性和他们之间相对的讨价还价能力,而零售商与平台的利润比却取决于时鲜产品的价格弹性和平台佣金比例.Modern electronic commerce and logistics facilitate the consumption of distant fresh product.In this paper,based on the generalized Nash negotiation approach in the cooperative game theory,the online retailing problem of the fresh products is investigated including the pricing and ordering strategies of the fresh products and the firms′performance under the platform-selling mode and the self-reselling mode.The results show that the wholesale and retailing prices are both increasing with the freshness increase of the fresh products.But the wholesale price is independent of the allocation percentage,while the retail price increases in the allocation percentage.The ordering quantity decreases in the allocation percentage but increases in the bargaining power of the retailer.The ratio between the retailer′s profit and the supplier′s profit is dependent on the price elasticity of the fresh product and their relative bargaining power,while the ratio between the retailer′s profit and the platform′s profit is dependent on the price elasticity of the fresh product and the allocation percentage.

关 键 词：时鲜产品 网络平台 网络零售 合作博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]