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作 者:高明 蒋思桦[1,2] GAO Ming;JIANG Sihua(School of Economics and Management,Fuzhou University,Fuzhou 350116,China;不详)
机构地区:[1]福州大学经济与管理学院,福建福州350116 [2]福州大学福建绿色发展研究院,福建福州350116
出 处:《武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版)》2021年第4期330-337,共8页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Information & Management Engineering
基 金:国家社会科学基金项目(18BGL176).
摘 要:为了研究消费者获利水平对电子废弃物最优回收模式的影响,构建了3种电子废弃物回收处理模型,采用博弈论对模型中的各主体变量和利润进行比较分析。研究结果表明:消费者获利水平对不同回收渠道有不同程度的影响,3种模型中制造商利润、系统总利润和回收率都会随着消费者获利水平的增加而降低。当制造商渠道建设费用满足一定条件时,制造商对回收模型选择会受到消费者获利水平的影响,零售商在R模型中的利润是最优的。在3种模型中消费者获利水平都不影响最优批发价格和零售价格。建议通过构建三方的价格回收协商机制、建立生产者环境责任制度、应用智能化等技术降低回收成本,以此提高电子废弃物回收水平。In order to study the impact of consumer profitability on the optimal recycling model of e-waste,the article constructs three e-waste recycling models,and uses game theory to compare and analyze the main variables and profits in the model.The results of the study show that the level of consumer profit has varying degrees of influence on different recycling channels.In the three models,the manufacturer′s profit,the total system profit and the recycling rate will all decrease as the level of consumer profit increases.When the manufacturer′s channel construction cost meets certain conditions,the manufacturer′s choice of recycling model will be affected by the consumer′s profit level,and the retailer′s profit in the R model is optimal.In the three models,the level of consumer profitability does not affect the optimal wholesale price and retail price.It is recommended to reduce the cost of recycling through the establishment of a tripartite price recovery negotiation mechanism,the establishment of a producer′s environmental responsibility system,and the application of intelligent technologies to improve the level of e-waste recycling.
关 键 词:回收模型 消费者获利水平 Stackberg博弈 电子废弃物 回收定价
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