考虑两期质量的交通运输PPP项目补贴和定价研究  

Subsidizing and pricing PPP transportation projects based on two-period quality

作　　者：王璐 王丹[2] 王雪青[2] WANG Lu;WANG Dan;WANG Xueqing(Guanghua School of Management,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China;College of Management and Economics,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China)

机构地区：[1]北京大学光华管理学院,北京100871 [2]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2021年第5期173-183,共11页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71772136)。

摘　　要：本文以交通运输PPP项目为研究对象,通过构建公私双方Stackelberg博弈模型,探究政府给予社会资本基于建设和运营期两期项目质量的最优补贴计划及其性质,并在此基础上得到了最优收费价格。本文分析了社会整体福利、企业利润、消费者剩余的变化情况,并对政府如何按效激励提出建议。结果表明:(1)政府可以通过补贴计划来激励社会资本提高两期质量,但只有当公共资金的边际成本足够低时,能够实现企业利润和消费者剩余的“帕累托优化”;(2)收费价格与激励强度具有替代效应,收费价格的提高能够促进社会资本提高努力水平;(3)最优政府补贴的两期质量激励强度相同,与建设期和运营期的努力成本差异无关,但与两期努力互补效应正相关;(4)随着公共资金边际成本的提升,最优收费价格提高,最优政府补贴的质量激励强度减小,社会资本对两期努力水平的分配受到扭曲;(5)在最优政府定价和补贴情况下,社会资本仅能获得保留效用,消费者剩余和社会福利是其保留效用的减函数。With the development of Public-Private Partnership(PPP),more and more public transport projects are invested,constructed and operated by private sectors.The private sector’s participation not only relieves the government’s budgetary burden,but also improves innovation and efficiency of transport projects.However,due to the pursuit of profit,private sector aims at maximizing the profit and sometimes neglects public interest.Meanwhile,the performance level decided by private sector based on its profit function is lower than the socially optimal performance level.Therefore,to achieve a higher performance level and improve social welfare,the government should offer incentives for performance improvement.Although a few existing studies have explored the performance-based subsidy model,they are limited to the operation period.In fact,the government provides subsidies for both the construction and operation period.If one-period subsidy is considered only,the relationship between construction and operation quality may be ignored,resulting in misestimation of the private sector’s behavior and thus influencing the effect of government subsidies.Therefore,this paper uses the quality of the construction and operation period to evaluate the private sector’s performance level,proposes a government subsidy plan based on the two-period quality,and further derives the optimal toll price.First,this paper explores the optimal subsidy plan and its property under a fixed toll price by establishing a public-private Stackelberg game model.Second,it compares the effort level and difference of two-period quality under the optimal subsidy plan with those in the benchmark model and the first best condition to explore the quality incentive effect of government subsidy.Third,this study analyzes the changes in social welfare,the private sector’s profit,and consumer surplus under the optimal subsidy plan.Fourth,based on the optimal subsidy plan,this paper obtains the optimal toll price and points out that the properties of the privat

关 键 词：交通运输PPP项目 政府补贴 两期质量 绩效激励 收费价格 

分 类 号：F294[经济管理—国民经济]