身份基广义指定验证者签密方案的分析  

Analysis of Universal Designated Verifier Identity-Based Signcryption Scheme

作　　者：徐明恒 周才学[1] XU Mingheng;ZHOU Caixue(School of Computer and Big Data Science,Jiujiang University,Jiujiang,China,332005)

机构地区：[1]九江学院计算机与大数据科学学院,江西九江332005

出　　处：《福建电脑》2021年第9期50-52,共3页Journal of Fujian Computer

基　　金：江西省教育厅科技项目(No.GJJ201807)资助。

摘　　要：为了更好地探究广义指定验证者签密方案的安全性,对一个随机预言机模型下的身份基广义指定验证者签密方案进行了安全性分析,利用接收者与任意第三方合谋的方法对原方案进行了伪造性攻击。本文通过对原方案的具体攻击,演示了一个恶意的接收者可以与某个第三方合谋来破坏方案的不可伪造性。该攻击表明原方案是不安全的,难以在实际环境中进行应用。To further explore the security of universal designated verifier signcryption systems,this paper analyses the security of a universal designated verifier identity-based signcryption scheme in the random oracle model.A forgery attack is made on the scheme by using the method of colluding with any third party by the receiver.Through the attack of the original scheme,this paper shows that a malicious receiver can collude with any third party to break the unforgeability of the scheme.The attack shows that the original scheme is insecure to be applied in the real environment.

关 键 词：广义指定验证者签密 身份基 双线性对 随机预言机 

分 类 号：TP309[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]