皖江地区企业污染治理的博弈分析  

Game Analysis on Pollution Control of Enterprises in Wanjiang Area

作　　者：陈森林 郝庆一 CHEN Senlin;HAO Qingyi(School of Mathematics and Physics,Anqing Normal University,Anqing 246133,China)

机构地区：[1]安庆师范大学数理学院,安徽安庆246133

出　　处：《安庆师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2021年第3期87-91,共5页Journal of Anqing Normal University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：安徽省自然科学基金项目(1908085MA22)。

摘　　要：随着社会经济的快速发展,生态环境保护越来越受到人们的重视。作为长江经济带的重要组成部分,皖江流域水污染现状不容乐观。该研究构建了皖江地区企业与群众之间的演化博弈模型,并模拟两个主体的策略转变。研究表明:只有加大对企业违法的处罚力度,提高企业主动治污的补贴,提升民众监督的积极性,才能稳定开展污染治理及环境保护工作,全面推进长江大保护。With the rapid development of economy and society, more and more attention has been paid to the protection of ecological environment. As an important part of the Yangtze River economic belt, the current situation of water pollution prevention and control in Wanjiang river basin is not optimistic. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model between enterprises and the masses in Wanjiang area, and simulates the strategic transformation of the two subjects.The research shows that only by increasing the cost of illegal activities, increasing the subsidies for enterprises to actively control pollution, and enhancing the enthusiasm of public supervision, can we steadily promote the governance of water pollution and environment,and comprehensively build the"great protection of the Yangtze River".

关 键 词：演化博弈 皖江保护 动力学模型 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]