转售价格维持协议的反垄断规制研究  

Study on Anti-monopoly Regulation of Resold Price Maintenance Agreement

作　　者：刘峰 刘施利 Liu Feng;Liu Shili(Yibin College,Yibin 644000 Sichuan)

机构地区：[1]宜宾学院,四川宜宾644000

出　　处：《黄冈职业技术学院学报》2021年第4期108-113,共6页Journal of Huanggang Polytechnic

基　　金：宜宾学院课题“数据平台企业的反垄断规制研究”(2021PY31)。

摘　　要：转售价格维持协议是市场中常见的垄断表现形式之一,我国《反垄断法》对此仅作出了原则性的规定。司法实践中多采取有罪推定原则,且在违法性判定上多关注协议本身的法律构成要件,而缺乏对协议经济内涵的考量。本文以转售价格维持协议的概念和市场效果作为研究基点,通过对典型案例的梳理分析,指出现行转售价格维持协议违法性判断方法的缺陷,提出应当采取以协议的市场效果为导向,充分考虑当事人市场力量与所处行业特性的方法,以期更为准确地识别此类垄断行为。The resale price maintenance agreement is one of the common forms of monopoly manifestations in the market, and China’s anti-monopoly law only stipulates it in principle. In judicial practice, the principle of presumption of guilt is more adopted, and more attention is paid to the legal components of the agreement itself in illegal judgment, but lacks the consideration of the economic connotation of the agreement. This paper takes the concept and market effect of the resale price maintenance agreement as the research basis, through analyzing typical cases, points out the defects of illegality judgment method, proposes that we should apply the market effect of agreement as the orientation, fully consider the market power of the parties and the industry characteristics, in order to more accurately identify such monopoly behavior.

关 键 词：转售价格维持协议 经济效果分析 反垄断法 

分 类 号：D912.294[政治法律—民商法学]