亨利对《笛卡尔式沉思》中移情难题的分析批评及其基于生命现象学的解决方案  

Henry's Analysis and Criticism of the Problem of Empathy in Cartesian Meditations and His Solution Based on the Phenomenology of Life

作　　者：江海全 Jiang Haiquan

机构地区：[1]海南师范大学政法学院 [2]武汉大学克雷茨曼研究所

出　　处：《哲学门》2015年第1期179-201,共23页Beida Journal of Philosophy

基　　金：郝长墀教授主持的国家社会科学基金“现象学中的逆意向性理论研究”(批准号10BZX050)的阶段性成果,并在其指导下完成。

摘　　要：移情发生的基础是什么?我为什么会对他者有感应或者我为什么能够感觉到他者?胡塞尔的意向性现象学没有给出解释,即使他试图解释它,也根本解释不清楚。因为胡塞尔囿于意向性现象学的视域,把空间事物的意向性被给予模式应用到生命的被给予模式,利用显现和随显的理论把他者构造出来;而亨利基于生命现象学的视角,放弃了意向性的感知和自我为出发点的两个预设,使胡塞尔的移情有了一个新的理论根基:生命共同体。亨利认为,我与他者共同享有一个先验的生命,生命的恻隐与共是我与他者交互感应的基础。What is the basis of empathy?Why would I be responsive to or why can I feel The Other?Husserl's intentional phenomenology has no explanation for this.In fact,it fundamentally cannot give a satisfactory explanation of it.This is because Husserl is confined by the perspective of intentional phenomenology,and so applies the intentional givenness model,which is appropriate for spatial objects,to life.According to this perspective,The Other is constituted based on the appearing and appresentation theory.In contrast,Henry,adopting the perspective of the phenomenology of life,abandons the two pre-requisites of Husserl's intentional phenomenology:the intentionality of perception and the self as a starting point.Consequently,Husserl's empathy theory has a new foundation:a life community.Henry believes that I and The Other share a common priori life:"pathos-with"in life is a basis for the mutual responsiveness between I and The Other.

关 键 词：亨利 移情 难题 生命 现象学 

分 类 号：B51[哲学宗教—外国哲学]