主体性理论视阙下弱人工智能的主体地位批驳  

On Legal Status of Weak Artificial Intelligence from Perspective of Subjectivity Theories

作　　者：梁成意[1] 焦阳 LIANG Cheng-yi;JIAO Yang(East China Jiaotong University,School of Humanities and Social Sciences,Nanchang 330013,China)

机构地区：[1]华东交通大学人文社会科学学院,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《宜春学院学报》2021年第7期23-28,共6页Journal of Yichun University

基　　金：2019年国家社会科学基金一般项目“人工智能语境下宪法财产权制度创新研究”(项目编号:19BFX016)。

摘　　要：康德主体性理论哲学视阙下,现阶段弱人工智能只能作为人权利所指向的客体,通过立法技术赋予其与人平等的法律主体地位将是对现有法律体系的颠覆。主体性理论框架内的弱人工智能只能作为受人役使的工具或代理人,其一切行为之法律效果应归于创造者或控制者,即弱人工智能控制下的财产及其所产生的法律效果原则上归属于利用弱人工智能创制法律事实的自然人等其他法律主体。from the perspective of Kant’s theory of subjectivity,weak artificial intelligence can only be treated as the object and tool used by human beings at this stage,but can not be formulated as a legal subject enjoying equal status with human beings.On this premise,weak artificial intelligence should be the object of human property rights.In the case of weak artificial intelligence controlling other property,it should be regarded as the agent or tool of human being,that is,the property under the control of weak artificial intelligence and its legal effect belong to the natural person,legal person or unincorporated unit controlled by artificial intelligence in principle.

关 键 词：主体性理论 弱人工智能 主体资格 财产权 

分 类 号：DF07[政治法律—法学理论]