不对称信息下权力结构对自有品牌引入的影响  

Impacts of power structure on the store brand entry with asymmetric information

作　　者：刘竞 傅科[2] 徐佳焱 LIU Jing;FU Ke;XU Jiayan(School of Business Administration,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou 310018,China;Lingnan College,Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou 510275,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江财经大学工商管理学院,杭州310018 [2]中山大学岭南学院,广州510275

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2021年第8期2056-2075,共20页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71671192,71721001,71802197);中山大学高校基本科研业务费专项资金(10000-31650524)。

摘　　要：自有品牌引入问题在不同权力结构下得到了广泛的研究.本文从需求信息不对称的角度综合考虑两种权力结构(零售商领导和制造商领导)下零售商引入自有品牌问题的特点和相互之间的关系.研究结果表明,引入自有品牌对于制造商和零售商利润的变化在不同权力结构下有着不同的影响.当需求信息在企业间存在差异时,供应链成员作为市场领导者的先动优势可能会消失,零售商和制造商作为市场追随者能够获得更高的利润.最后,从信息管理的角度发现,市场参与者对于信息获取能力的偏好和供应链成员之间的信息共享在不同权力结构下也有着显著差异.Prior literature has studied extensively on store brand entry under different power structures between the national-brand manufacturer and the retailer.This paper considers the characteristic and the relationship between two alternative Stackelberg games(manufacturer-led and retailer-led)with store brand entry under an asymmetric demand scenario where the retailer possesses the private demand information.The results show that the impacts of the store brand on the players’profits under each Stackelberg games are different.In addition,when the information is asymmetric,the first-mover advantage for the firms may disappear and they can obtain more profits when acting as the follower.Finally,the players’preference for informational acquisition capability and the information sharing between firms also show some significant differences between different power structures.

关 键 词：自有品牌引入 权力结构 不对称信息 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]