基于损耗管理的生鲜农产品供应链可追溯决策的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Traceability Decision of Fresh Agricultural Products Supply Chain Based on Loss Management

作　　者：薛伟霞 许志端[1] XUE Wei-xia;XU Zhi-duan(School of Management,Xiamen University,Xiamen,Fujian 361005)

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《供应链管理》2021年第9期16-25,共10页SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT

摘　　要：生鲜农产品供应链实现可追溯是降低损耗的有效方式,文章基于损耗管理构建生鲜农产品批发商和零售商二级供应链可追溯的博弈模型,分析集中和分散决策下供应链可追溯的投资决策。结果发现,无论集中决策还是分散决策,自愿可追溯都比强制可追溯下的成本空间大。批发商主导的主从博弈下,可追溯成本的分担系数对供应链各方的利润没有影响。批发商对残值的认定和回收,能够实现供应链各方利润的帕累托改进。In fresh agricultural products supply chain(FASC)management,reducing losses is an important issue.The traceability of FASC is an effective way to reduce the losses.In this paper,a game model of fresh agricultural products wholesaler and retailer s two-level supply chain is established based on loss management.The traceable investment decisions of FASC under centralized and decentralized decisions are analyzed.The results show that the cost space of voluntary traceability is larger than that of mandatory traceability in both centralized and decentralized decisions.When the wholesaler acts as the leader of the Stackelberg,the sharing coefficient of traceability cost has no effect on the profits of all parties in the supply chain.The wholesaler s identification and recovery of residual value can promote the Pareto improvement of the profits of all parties in the supply chain.

关 键 词：损耗管理 生鲜农产品供应链 可追溯 博弈论 

分 类 号：F252.3[经济管理—国民经济]