管理报酬与企业社保缴费——以高管薪酬为例  

Management Remuneration and Corporate Social Security Contribution:Case of Executive Compensation

作　　者：郭磊[1] 周颖 宋晓满 GUO Lei;ZHOU Ying;SONG Xiaoman(School of Economics and Management,TJU,Shanghai 200092,China;Zhejiang College,TJU,Jiaxing 314051,China)

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院公共管理系,上海200092 [2]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092 [3]同济大学浙江学院,浙江嘉兴314051

出　　处：《中国软科学》2021年第8期172-180,共9页China Soft Science

基　　金：教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(18JZD047)。

摘　　要：管理作为生产要素报酬较高,可能挤出作为劳动报酬的企业社保缴费,危及社保体系资金安全,恶化收入分配格局。以2007—2017年A股上市公司为样本,以高管薪酬为例,考察管理报酬对企业基本养老保险、住房公积金缴费的影响。结果显示:(1)高管薪酬挤出企业社保缴费,货币薪酬的作用大于权益薪酬,基本养老保险受到的影响大于住房公积金;(2)作用机制在于,高管薪酬提高时,策略性提高职工到手工资以减少阻力,再减少社保缴费以缓解成本压力;(3)挤出效应在资产和职工较少的企业,缴费水平较高的行业和地区更强。更换多种测量方式,选择不同样本,结果依然稳健。该发现有助于深入理解管理报酬与劳动报酬的关系,拓展了高管薪酬对企业决策、企业社保缴费的影响因素的研究。建议政府关注管理报酬对劳动报酬的侵蚀,企业考虑多种生产要素报酬的相互影响,职工审慎权衡工资和社保。Using the A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2017 as the sample and the case of executive compensation,this paper examines the impact of management remuneration on corporate social security contribution.The results show that(1)executive compensation is negatively related to corporate social security contribution,in which monetary compensation plays a bigger role than equity compensation does and the Basic Pension Scheme is more affected than the Housing Provident Fund is;(2)the negative relationship between executive compensation and corporate social security contribution is more pronounced in stated-owned or smaller enterprises and in those firms with higher industrial or regional contribution rates;and(3)executive compensation is positively related to employees’non-benefits compensation which is negatively related to corporate social security contribution.These empirical findings highlight that management remuneration crowds out labor remuneration and will be value to policy makers in pursuit of social stability in emerging markets.

关 键 词：货币薪酬 权益薪酬 基本养老保险 住房公积金 挤出效应 

分 类 号：C979[经济管理—劳动经济]