演化博弈下煤矿事故的应急救援能力建设及仿真分析  

Construction and simulation analysis of emergency rescue ability of coal mine accidents under evolutionary game

作　　者：刘海涛[1] 熊浩浩 郝传波[1] 朱腾 王乐清 Liu Haitao;Xiong Haohao;Hao Chuanbo;Zhu Teng;Wang Yueqing(Heilongjiang Ground Pressure & Gas Control in Deep Mining Key Lab, Heilongjiang University of Science & Technology, Harbin 150022, China)

机构地区：[1]黑龙江科技大学黑龙江省煤矿深部开采地压控制与瓦斯治理重点实验室,哈尔滨150022

出　　处：《黑龙江科技大学学报》2021年第5期554-561,共8页Journal of Heilongjiang University of Science And Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(52074110);中央支持地方高校改革发展资金优秀青年人才项目(2020YQ13)。

摘　　要：为提高区域内政府与煤矿企业应急救援协作水平,利用演化博弈理论和数值仿真方法构建政企协作演化博弈模型。研究表明:为实现煤矿应急救援能力协作建设最优,在严格监督协作和积极投入协作的收益大于不严格监督协作和不积极投入协作的收益的条件下,演化结果符合目标。在此约束条件下,适当提高监督惩罚力度、政策约束等会促使双方博弈加快向最优状态演化;投入的协作成本与系统趋于最优决策成反比,在一定程度上,通过提高相互信任度、降低机会主义等可以减少协作投入,达到协作与应急能力建设的最优稳定状态。在此基础上,建议中央有关监督部门加强约束及建立奖惩机制,地方政府和地方煤矿企业在安全技术创新、应急信息共享等方面加大投入。This paper aims to improve the cooperation level of emergency rescue ability between local government and local coal mining enterprises.The improvement is accomplished by creating an evolutionary game model of capacity cooperation construction between local government and local coal mining enterprises using evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation method;and simulating the dynamic evolution path before and after the optimization of cost-benefit parameters by performing the scenario analysis of the subject behavior game and the numerical simulation of the replication dynamic equation.The research shows that in order to achieve the optimal cooperative construction of coal mine emergency rescue capacity,under the condition that the benefits of strict supervision cooperation and active investment cooperation are greater than those of non-strict supervision cooperation and active investment cooperation,the evolution results meet the goal.Under this condition,appropriately increasing the intensity of supervision and punishment and policy constraints will accelerate the evolution of the game to the optimal state;and the cooperation cost of investment is inversely proportional to the optimal decision-making of the system and to a certain extent,improving mutual trust and reducing opportunism could result in the reduced cooperation investment to achieve the optimal stable state of cooperation and emergency capacity-building.On this basis,it is suggested that the relevant central supervision departments should strengthen constraints and establish reward and punishment mechanisms,and local governments and local coal mining enterprises should increase investment in safety technology innovation and emergency information sharing.

关 键 词：煤矿事故 应急救援 演化博弈 

分 类 号：TD77.1[矿业工程—矿井通风与安全]