强制责任保险能降低食品行业的股价崩盘风险吗?  

Can Compulsory Liability Insurance Reduce the Risk of Stock Price Collapse in the Food Industry?

作　　者：孔东民[1] 王玉苗 石路 KONG Dongmin;WANG Yumiao;SHI Lu(School of Economics,Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430074,China;School of Management,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan 430070,China)

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学经济学院,湖北武汉430074 [2]武汉理工大学管理学院,湖北武汉430070

出　　处：《南京审计大学学报》2021年第5期71-81,共11页Journal of Nanjing Audit University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(21ZDA010);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71772178)。

摘　　要：利用中国食品安全强制责任保险制度的外生冲击,实证探究强制责任保险制度的实施对股价崩盘风险的影响。研究发现:基于保险机构的监管效应,强制责任保险制度的实施通过加强食品生产监管降低经营业绩波动,显著降低食品上市公司的股价崩盘风险;而且该政策效应在非国有上市公司、机构投资者持股较少以及信息不对称较高的上市公司更加显著。由此表明,公共与私营部门所形成的共同监管机制能有效加强食品安全监管。Using the exogenous impact of China's food safety compulsory liability insurance system,this paper empirically explores the impact of the implementation of compulsory liability insurance system on the risk of stock price collapse.It is found that based on the regulatory effect of insurance institutions,the implementation of compulsory liability insurance system can significantly reduce the stock price collapse risk of food listed companies by strengthening the supervision of food production and reducing the fluctuation of operating performance.Moreover,the policy effect is more significant in non-state-owned listed companies,listed companies with less shares held by institutional investors and listed companies with serious information asymmetry.Overall,this study presents that the joint supervision mechanism formed by the public and private sectors can effectively strengthen food safety supervision.

关 键 词：食品安全责任强制保险 股价崩盘风险 业绩波动 道德风险 外部监管 公司治理 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F840.3[经济管理—保险] F275