政府审计、公款消费与费用操纵  

Government Audit,Public Funds Consumption and Cost Manipulation

作　　者：李佳[1] 罗正英[1] 权小锋[1] LI Jia;LUO Zhengying;QUAN Xiaofeng(Dongwu Business School,Suzhou University,Suzhou 215006,China)

机构地区：[1]苏州大学东吴商学院,江苏苏州215006

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2021年第5期24-34,共11页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(17ZDA087)。

摘　　要：采用双重差分方法实证检验政府审计对国有企业公款消费的影响,研究发现:在政府审计介入当年及以后年度,被审计的国企控股上市公司消费性现金支出费用化率和波动性显著下降,公款消费实质性减少,公款消费计入存货的费用操纵行为显著减少,政府审计对公款消费的监督和治理职能得以证实;然而,管理层仍然可能会将消费性现金支出转入非流动资产处置损失等营业外支出科目,并且在政府审计介入之后,消费性现金支出的粘性并没有显著降低,可见政府审计并没有完全解决公款消费相关的代理问题。This paper uses the method of double difference to test the influence of government audit on the public funds consumption of state owned enterprises.The empirical results show that in the year of government audit intervention and the following years,the expensization rate and volatility of the consumer cash expenditure of the audited listed companies controlled by the state owned enterprises have decreased significantly,the consumption of public funds has decreased substantially,and the manipulation of the cost of public funds consumption included in inventory has decreased significantly.This confirms the supervision and governance function of government audit on public funds consumption,but the management may still have the manipulation of transferring the consumption cash expenditure into non operating expenditure such as non current assets disposal profit and loss,and the stickiness of consumption cash expenditure has not been significantly reduced after the government audit intervention.It can be seen that the government audit does not completely solve the agency problem related to public funds consumption.

关 键 词：国有企业 公款消费 消费性现金 费用操纵 政府审计 粘性 非流动资产处置损失 

分 类 号：F239.44[经济管理—会计学]