碳排放收费对企业碳排放和产量决策的影响--基于古诺博弈  

The Effect of Carbon Emission Charges on Corporate Carbon Emissions and Production Decisions:Based on Cournot Game

作　　者：赵刘威 彭振革 高鹏 ZHAO Liuwei;PENG Zhenge;GAO Peng(School of Business,Jiangsu University of Technology,Changzhou 213001,China;School of Management,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China)

机构地区：[1]江苏理工学院商学院,江苏常州213001 [2]江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《江苏理工学院学报》2021年第4期95-103,共9页Journal of Jiangsu University of Technology

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目“第三方治污企业二次环境污染行为形成、演化与治理策略研究”(21YJCZH236);江苏高校哲学社会科学研究项目“基于系统动力学分析企业环境行为的监管与引导策略”(2019SJA1051)。

摘　　要：针对政府碳减排目标下企业产量与减排决策问题,通过古诺竞争博弈模型,研究排放费用对市场结构、产量和排放水平的影响。从市场复杂性演化的内生视角出发,分析了市场竞争波动的内在机制。在边际利润调整的假设下,分析了排放费用对双寡头和自然垄断市场的稳定性及排放水平的影响。研究表明:当边际排放费用随着排放水平增加而增加时,双寡头垄断是稳定的;当边际排放费用随着排放水平增加而下降时,双寡头市场结构是不稳定的,系统收敛于自然垄断;垄断情形下,均衡产出和均衡排放高于双寡头结构。Aiming at the decision-making of enterprise output and emission reduction under the government’s carbon emission reduction target,this paper studies the impact of emission cost on market structure,output and emission level through Cournot competition game model.From the endogenous perspective of market complexity evolution,the internal mechanism of market competition fluctuation is analyed.Under the assumption of marginal profit adjustment,the impact of emission cost on the stability and emission level of duopoly and natural monopoly market is analyzed.The results show that when the marginal emission cost increases with the increase of emission level,the duopoly is stable,when the marginal emission cost decreases with the increase of emission level,the duopoly market structure is unstable and the system converges to natural monopoly.In the case of monopoly,the equilibrium output and equilibrium emission are higher than that of duopoly structure.

关 键 词：碳排放 排放费用 古诺竞争 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]