为何男方家庭支付更多的结婚费用——基于信号理论的解释  

Why Grooms’ Families Pay More for Marriage Expenses: Explanation from the Perspective of Signal Investment

作　　者：符国群[1] 李杨 费显政[3] Fu Guoqun;Li Yang;Fei Xianzheng(Guanghua School of Management,Peking University;Business School,Beijing Technology and Business University;School of Business Administration,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law)

机构地区：[1]北京大学光华管理学院,100871 [2]北京工商大学商学院,100048 [3]中南财经政法大学工商管理学院,430073

出　　处：《经济评论》2021年第5期152-166,共15页Economic Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目“家庭购买决策过程与机制研究:基于‘匹配’和‘社会比较’的视角”(项目编号:71632001)的资助。

摘　　要：本文基于我国男性婚姻挤压和婚姻市场上女性处于更大程度信息不对称的双重事实,运用信息经济学中的信号发射理论来解释我国城市婚姻市场为何男方原生家庭支付绝大部分结婚费用。来自城镇家庭的调查数据显示,随着男女双方从相识到结婚的时间增加,男方家庭承担的结婚费用比例将下降;女方学历越高,其要求进行婚姻担保的动机越弱,男方原生家庭承担的结婚费用比例下降;"婚房"支出作为承诺信号,比其他结婚支出具有更大的担保作用。上述结论均与信号发射理论的预测相一致,据此我们认为,相对于"婚姻竞争说""婚姻补偿说"等既有关于彩礼和嫁妆的理论,基于"婚姻承诺"或"婚姻担保"的信号理论对婚姻市场上男女原生家庭在结婚费用分担上的不对称性更有解释力。Building on the fact of male marriage squeeze and the high degree of information dissymmetry that females experience in marriage market, this paper applys signal emission theory of information economics to explain the phenomenon that groom’s family pays the majority of marital expenses in China. According to the survey results of urban families, we found that along with the increasing time that male and female knew each other before getting married, the proportion of the man’s family who bears the cost of marriage will decrease. Meanwhile, females with higher education would have less motivation to request marriage guarantee. In addition, "real estate for marriage"as a signal of commitment has a greater guarantee effect than other marriage expenditures. The above conclusions are consistent with the predictions of the signal emission theory. Based on this, we believe that, compared with the "marriage competition theory" and "marriage compensation theory", the signal theory based on "marriage promise" or "marriage guarantee" has more explanatory power for the asymmetry of the marriage cost sharing between male and female native families in the marriage market.

关 键 词：结婚消费 婚姻挤压 信息不对称 婚姻承诺 城镇家庭 

分 类 号：C913.1[经济管理]