项目下乡为何总陷“精英俘获”陷阱——基于苏北S县的实证研究  

Why Projects Going to the Countryside Always Fall into the Trap of"Elite Capture":Evidence from S County in North Jiangsu Province

作　　者：汤瑜 于水[2] TANG Yu;YU Shui(School of Public Policy and Administration,Xi'an Jiaotong University,Xi'an,Shaanxi 710049,China;School of Public Administration,Nanjing Agricultural University,Nanjing,Jiangsu 210095,China)

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学公共政策与管理学院,陕西西安710049 [2]南京农业大学公共管理学院,江苏南京210095

出　　处：《求实》2021年第5期97-108,112,共13页Truth Seeking

摘　　要：项目下乡中的精英俘获不仅包含精英人物对特定资源的占有,还包含精英地区对普通地区项目资源的挤占。精英俘获并不必然来源于制度缺陷或精英作恶,项目分配中的偶然初始选择、自我强化机制和成本收益考量是导致精英俘获的重要原因之一,其中制度隔离发挥了突出作用。这也解释了为何正式制度和国家权力对精英俘获的规训失效。The elite capture in projects going to the countryside includes not only the possession of spe-cific resources by elites,but also the squeezing of project resources in ordinary areas by elite areas.Elite capture does not necessarily come from institutional defects or elite evil.Accidental initial selec-tion,self-reinforcing mechanism and cost-benefit consideration in project allocation are one of the im-portant reasons leading to elite capture.Among them,institutional isolation has played a prominentrole.This also explains why the formal system and state power are ineffective in the discipline of elitecapture.

关 键 词：乡村治理 项目下乡 精英俘获 偶然初始选择 自我强化机制 成本收益考量 

分 类 号：F323[经济管理—产业经济]