卡默勒现象意识的幻觉主义分析  

An Analysis of Kammerer’s Illusionism about Phenomenal Consciousness

作　　者：符彬 FU Bin(College of Economics and Management,Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,Fuzhou 350002,China)

机构地区：[1]福建农林大学经济学院,福建福州350002

出　　处：《厦门理工学院学报》2021年第4期14-18,共5页Journal of Xiamen University of Technology

摘　　要：卡默勒的幻觉主义理论是现象意识分析中一种不同的声音。其幻觉主义理论认为:现象意识是一个幻觉;可基于相似性理论来解释现象意识的机制,指出现象意识就是外部物理性质经模块处理的结果,其处理过程遵循表象原则、接受喜好原则、配置原则和个例化原则;现象意识的幻觉元是解释现象意识为何强烈的问题。幻觉主义理论为现象意识的分析提供了一个新的思路,但也存在着如特殊心理模块等的理论缺陷。Kammerer's illusionism is a different kind of voice in phenomenal consciousness analysis.He believes that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion,the mechanism of which can be explained by TCE theory,and which results from the external objects operated in a modular way following Principle of Appearance,Principle of Receptive Affection,Principle of Resemblance and Principle of Individuation.The illusion meta-problem concerns the explanation of its peculiar strength.Illusionism provides a new idea for phenomenal consciousness study,while theoretical defects remain in it such as special psychological module.

关 键 词：卡默勒 现象意识 幻觉主义 心理模块 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]