我国公司治理双重股权结构的监管机制再认识  被引量:5

Re-understanding of China′s Dual-Share Structure Supervision Mechanism

在线阅读下载全文

作  者:刘杰勇 LIU Jie-yong(Law School of Peking University,Beijing 100871,China)

机构地区:[1]北京大学法学院,北京100871

出  处:《商业研究》2021年第5期131-139,共9页Commercial Research

摘  要:双重股权结构作为与同股同权结构并存互补的股权治理结构,因具有扩大融资、保持控制权和规避恶意收购等优势,受到成长期创新型公司热捧,也逐步被全球资本市场普遍接受。近两年我国港交所与上交所科创板先后引进双重股权结构。双重股权结构虽比同股同权结构的代理成本高,却也是初创型高科技公司所有权的最优安排,但为削减代理成本需构建有效的监管机制。我国双重股权结构监管机制可分为内部与外部两个层面:内部监管上,创始人对采用双重股权结构的初创公司持续投入专用性人力资本,对公司拥有强烈心理所有权,形成创始人自我约束机制;外部监管上,港交所和上交所科创板的上市规则通过上市公司资格要求、采用时机限制、B股股东资格要求、B股表决权限制、信息披露与设置监管机构等具体措施予以规制。Dual-share structure,as an equity governance structure coexisting and complementing with the single-share structure,has been warmly welcomed by the growing innovative companies and generally accepted by the global capital market for its advantages of expanding financing,maintaining control rights and avoiding malicious acquisitions.In recent two years,Hong Kong Stock Exchange and Shanghai Stock Exchange have introduced dual-share structure.Although the agency cost of dual-share structure is higher than that of single-share structure,it is the optimal arrangement of company ownership.In order to reduce agency costs,it is necessary to build an effective regulatory mechanism.The supervision mechanism of dual-share structure in China can be divided into internal and external aspects:in the internal supervision mechanism,the founders continuously invest a large amount of special human capital to start-up companies with dual-share structure,and have strong psychological ownership of the company,forming the founder′s self-restraint mechanism;on the external regulatory mechanism,the Listing Rules of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange′s sci-tech innovation board are adopted specific measures such as timing restriction,qualification requirements of listed companies,qualification requirements of B-share shareholders and voting rights of B-shares,information disclosure and the establishment of regulatory agency.

关 键 词:公司治理 双重股权结构 同股同权结构 代理成本 外部监管 内部监管 

分 类 号:DF41[政治法律—经济法学] D912.29[政治法律—法学]

 

参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

耦合文献:

正在载入数据...

 

引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

同被引文献:

正在载入数据...

 

相关期刊文献:

正在载入数据...

相关的主题
相关的作者对象
相关的机构对象