财政分权、政府间竞争与地方政府债务风险——基于省级数据空间效应的实证  

Fiscal Decentralization, Intergovernmental Competition and Local Government Debt Risk——An Empirical Study on Spatial Effect of Provincial Data

作　　者：韩凤芹 蔡佳颖 Han Fengqin;Cai Jiaying(Chinese Academy of Fiscal Sciences,Beijing 100036,China)

机构地区：[1]中国财政科学研究院,北京100036

出　　处：《统计与决策》2021年第17期149-154,共6页Statistics & Decision

摘　　要：地方政府债务风险是关系中国经济可持续发展和地方财政健康运行的焦点问题。文章在充分考虑新发展理念的基础上,将政府间竞争的空间效应引入分析模型,考察财政分权体制下的政府间竞争对地方政府债务风险的影响。研究表明:财政分权将提高地方政府债务的风险系数,政府间竞争加剧了财政分权对债务风险的正向促进作用;空间分析发现,以创新为主导的经济竞争,对发展程度相近地区的债务风险具有一定的抑制作用,说明高质量的地方竞争机制,在一定程度上减弱了政府间竞争对债务风险的不利影响。The risk of local government debt is a key issue related to the sustainable development of China’s economy and the healthy operation of local finance. Based on the full consideration of the new development concept, this paper introduces the spatial effect of intergovernmental competition into the analysis model to investigate the impact of intergovernmental competition on local debt risk under the fiscal decentralization system. The researches show that fiscal decentralization increases the risk coefficient of local government debt, and intergovernmental competition intensifies the positive effect of fiscal decentralization on debt risk. The spatial analysis finds that innovation-led economic competition has a certain inhibitory effect on debt risk in areas with similar development level, indicating that the high-quality local competition mechanism, to a certain extent, has weakened the adverse impact of intergovernmental competition on debt risks.

关 键 词：地方政府债务风险 财政分权 政府间竞争 空间效应 空间杜宾模型 

分 类 号：F061.5[经济管理—政治经济学]