权力结构影响下考虑预售的双渠道供应链决策研究  

Research on the Decision-making of Dual-channel Supply Chain Considering Advance Selling under Different Power Structures

作　　者：曹晓宁 刘晓冰[1] CAO Xiao-ning;LIU Xiao-bing(School of Economics and Management, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China)

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学经济管理学院,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2021年第9期93-99,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(17BGL084);中央高校科研基金(DUT18GF108);工业和信息化部2017年制造业“双创”平台试点示范项目:装备制造企业一体化集成管控平台试点示范项目。

摘　　要：针对存在预售且通过网络与传统渠道销售的现实状况,基于消费者剩余理论和博弈论,构建不同权力结构下的双渠道供应链博弈模型:制造商主导的Stackelberg、权力对等的Vertical Nash和零售商主导的Stackelberg。比较三种权力结构下各成员最优策略及绩效,分析关键因素的敏感性,检验模型的鲁棒性。研究发现:三种博弈下各权力主体的最优策略及绩效均受渠道替代程度、单位生产成本等关键因素影响。渠道替代程度越高,制定的双渠道价格越高;消费者对价格更敏感,预售市场需求呈现向现售市场转移的趋势。Given that the manufacturer distributes products through a wholly-owned direct channel and an independent traditional channel in advance and regular selling stages,we investigate the optimal strategies under different power structures in a dual-channel supply chain.Based on the relationship of the manufacturer and its retailer,we establish manufacturer-dominated Stackelberg,manufacturer-retailer Vertical Nash,and retailer-dominated Stackelberg game models respectively.Then,we compare the optimal strategies,analyze the sensitivity of key factors,and verify the robustness of game models.Finally,we find that the channel substitutability degree and marginal production cost are key factors that affect the optimal strategies and performances of supply chain members.As the channel substitutability degree increases,the market demand in advance selling turns to that in regular selling.The reason is the customers become more sensitive to the prices,which increase with the channel substitutability degree.

关 键 词：权力结构 预售 双渠道供应链 渠道替代程度 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]