从正当自由到应得利益:评潘恩的权利观念  

From Legitimate Freedom to Due Interest:on Penn's Concept of Rights

作　　者：张恒山 ZHANG Hengshan(Tianjin University Law School,Tianjin 300072)

机构地区：[1]天津大学法学院,天津300072

出　　处：《扬州大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2021年第4期23-31,共9页Journal of Yangzhou University(Humanities and Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：中共中央党校重大课题“中国特色社会主义制度中的政治法律建设”

摘　　要：潘恩的权利观代表着古典自然法学权利观的终结,也标志着自然法学权利观的重大转折。潘恩受其关注的特定问题、特定的视域和特定的思维方式所影响,在抛弃自然法这一前提下直接断言人的天赋权利,并形成以“应得利益”为实际内容的权利观,从而完成了从古典自然法学的“正当自由”权利观向“应得利益”权利观的转换。潘恩的权利观值得我们深思的是:“应得”的理由和标准是什么?Penn's view of rights represents the end of the classical view of rights in natural law,and also marks a significant turning point in the view of rights in natural law.Pan en,determined by his particular concerns,specific horizons and specific ways of thinking,directly asserted the natural rights of human beings on the premise of abandoning the natural law,and formed a right view with “due interests”as the actual content,thus completing the transformation from the “legitimate freedom”right view of classical natural law to the “due interests”right view.What we should ponder is:what is the reason and standard of “deserved”?

关 键 词：权利 天赋权利 正当自由 应得利益 

分 类 号：D08[政治法律—政治学]