政府防疫抗疫机制分析——基于双层委托代理关系视角  

Research on Government Epidemic Prevention and Control Mechanism——From the Perspective of Double Principal-Agent Relationship

作　　者：彭明旭 王呈斌 董秀良[2] 陈耸 PENG Ming-xu;WANG Cheng-bin;DONG Xiu-liang;CHEN Song(Business School,Taizhou University,Taizhou 318000;School of Management,Jilin University,Changchun 130000)

机构地区：[1]台州学院商学院,浙江台州318000 [2]吉林大学管理学院,长春130000

出　　处：《软科学》2021年第9期14-21,共8页Soft Science

基　　金：江西省社会科学规划项目(17YJ09);台州市哲学社会科学规划课题(20GHY08)。

摘　　要：基于双层委托代理的视角,构建了中央政府—地方政府—基层防疫组织三者间防疫抗疫的委托代理模型,研究中美政府防疫抗疫的机制差异及其结果,以及疫情初始条件变化对中美政府策略和行为的影响。结果发现:①在不考虑期初感染人群且政府为风险中性类型的情况下,政府防疫抗疫的努力水平与政府的成本系数相关;选择固定授权还是灵活授权,取决于所分配的权利和资源是否具有专用型;在应对重大疫情方面,中国集中统一领导下的灵活授权机制优于美国联邦分权的固定授权机制。②当考虑期初感染人数且政府为风险偏好型时,模型出现了多重均衡解,意味着不同政策可能都是政府的最优选择,从而较好解释了美国出现的类似"保经济"和"抗疫情"的政策摇摆现象。Based on the perspective of two-tier principal-agent, this paper constructs a principal-agent model of epidemic prevention and control among the central government, local government and grassroots epidemic prevention organizations, and then it studies the mechanism differences and results of government epidemic prevention and control, as well as the impact of changes in initial conditions of epidemic situation on government strategies and actions. Results show that, firstly, without considering the initial infected population and the government is risk-neutral, the government’s effort level of epidemic prevention and control is related to the government’s cost coefficient. The choice of fixed authorization or flexible authorization depends on whether the allocated rights and resources are specialized. In response to major outbreaks, China’s flexible delegation mechanism under centralized and unified leadership of the central Government is better than that of the United States federal government fixed authorization mechanism of decentralization. Secondly, considering the number of infected people at the beginning of the period and the government is risk-lovable, the model has multiple equilibrium solutions which means that different policies may be the local optimal choice of government, which can better explain the policy swing phenomenon similar to "economic protection" and "epidemic control situation" in the United States.

关 键 词：政府 防疫抗疫机制 委托代理 

分 类 号：R197.1[医药卫生—卫生事业管理] C93[医药卫生—公共卫生与预防医学]