2021年世界交通运输大会水运学部会议 水铁联运专线建设投资演化博弈分析  

Meeting of the Waterborne Transport Division,World Transport Convention 2021(WTC 2021)Analysis on investment evolutionary game of water-rail combined transport dedicated line construction

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作  者:盛进路[1,2] 李小凤 于敏[1] 龚毅 杨忠振 SHENG Jinlu;LI Xiaofeng;YU Min;GONG Yi;YANG Zhongzhen(College of Traffic & Transportation, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China;Chongqing Key Laboratory of Transportation Engineering, Chongqing 400074, China;Faculty of Maritime and Transportation, Ningbo University, Ningbo 315211, Zhejiang, China)

机构地区:[1]重庆交通大学交通运输学院,重庆400074 [2]重庆市交通运输工程重点实验室,重庆400074 [3]宁波大学海运学院,浙江宁波315211

出  处:《上海海事大学学报》2021年第3期41-46,126,共7页Journal of Shanghai Maritime University

基  金:铁路与海运协同的外贸集装箱运输系统优化研究(72072097)。

摘  要:针对谁来主导投资建设水铁联运专线问题,通过分析其中涉及的主要利益者之间的利益关系,建立三方演化博弈模型。通过演化博弈理论并结合MATLAB仿真,揭示在有限理性条件下,博弈各方进行决策的行为特征及其稳定状态。结果表明:在投资收益大于原有收益情形下,政府和港口部门将选择独立投资或合作投资建设水铁联运专线,铁路部门将选择合作投资建设水铁联运专线。Aiming at the question of who will lead the investment in the construction of the water-rail combined transport dedicated line,a tripartite evolutionary game model is established by analyzing the interest relationships among the main stakeholders involved.Through the evolutionary game theory combined with MATLAB simulation,it reveals the behavioral characteristics and stable states of decision-making of all parties in the game under bounded rationality conditions.The results show that:when the investment profit is greater than the original profit,the government and the port department will choose to invest independently or cooperatively in the construction of the water-rail combined transport dedicated line,and the railway department will choose to invest cooperatively in the construction of the water-rail combined transport dedicated line.

关 键 词:综合交通运输 交通运输经济 投资策略 水铁联运 演化博弈 

分 类 号:F512.3[经济管理—产业经济]

 

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