价格信息传递、政策扶持与上游产品的高价格——基于信号博弈的分析  

Price Signaling,Policy Supporting and Higher Price of Upstream Products:The Analysis Based on Signaling Game

作　　者：罗云辉[1] 林洁[2] LUO Yunhui;LIN Jie(School of Management, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China;Finance School, Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, Shanghai 201620, China)

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433 [2]上海对外经贸大学金融管理学院,上海201620

出　　处：《复旦学报（自然科学版）》2021年第4期401-409,共9页Journal of Fudan University：Natural Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71373053);上海市浦江人才计划(12pjrc084)。

摘　　要：本文研究下游行业由特定企业代表全行业进行价格协商且该企业成本存在信息不对称的市场结构中,导致上游产品高价格的机理和条件.研究发现,在一定的下游行业市场需求和企业成本结构条件下,市场存在分离均衡,从而高效率类型的下游谈判企业愿意接受较高价格的上游产品,或者不接受可能的政策扶持,以此发送其高效率的信号,进而减少竞争对手的产量,并提高自身的产量和利润水平.We propose a new explanation for the notable increasing price of upstream products in particular market structure.In the model,the down-steam negotiator's type is private information,while its competitors'characteristics are common knowledge.There does exist‘separating equilibrium’condition on some exogenous parameters,in which‘higher efficiency’negotiator inclines to accept comparative higher up-steam product price to signing its type directly or indirectly.The benefit of this kind of costly signing behavior is that it could decrease competitors'quantities,while increase negotiator's quantities and profit level.

关 键 词：信号博弈 分离均衡 产量竞争 

分 类 号：F062.5[经济管理—政治经济学]