放松卖空限制与企业创新激励研究  

Enterprise Innovation Incentive and The Relaxation of Short Selling Restriction

作　　者：高丽[1] 卢茜 GAO Li;LU Xi

机构地区：[1]新疆财经大学金融学院

出　　处：《金融监管研究》2021年第7期101-114,共14页Financial Regulation Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金地区科学基金项目“能源商品金融化、价格冲击与中国——中亚经济合作研究”的资助,项目编号:71764028。

摘　　要：金融改革的核心目标是推动实体经济发展。本文以2010—2019年A股上市公司为样本,研究了放松卖空限制对企业创新的影响,并进一步分析了规模异质性、信息传递效率异质性、地区异质性和分析师追踪的中介效应。研究表明:(1)放松卖空限制对企业创新具有激励效应,且该效应通过了一系列稳健性检验。(2)该正向效应在规模小的企业、信息传递效率高的企业和东部地区的企业最为显著。(3)分析师追踪引发的外部监督加强,在放松卖空限制对企业创新的激励过程中存在中介效应。在上述研究成果的基础上,本文提出了相关政策建议。The core purpose of financial reform is to promote the development of real economy.Taking A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2019 as samples,this paper studies the impact of relaxing short selling restrictions on the innovation of enterprises,and further analyzes the scale heterogeneity,information transmission efficiency heterogeneity,regional heterogeneity and the mediating effect of analyst tracking.The results show that:(1)relaxing the restriction of short selling has an incentive effect on enterprise innovation,and this effect has passed a series of robustness tests.(2)The positive effect is most significant in small-scale enterprises,enterprises with high information transmission efficiency and enterprises in the eastern region.(3)The strengthening of external supervision caused by analyst tracking has a mediating effect in the incentive process of relaxing short selling restrictions on enterprise innovation.Based on the above research results,this paper puts forward relevant policy suggestions.

关 键 词：放松卖空限制 分析师追踪 企业创新 中介效应 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]