谈判势力视角下双边平台独占交易合约的效应研究  

Research on the Effect of Bilateral Platform Exclusive Trading Contract from the Perspective of Negotiating Power

作　　者：李相辰 李凯[1] LI Xiangchen;LI Kai(Northeastern University,Shenyang,China)

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,沈阳市110169

出　　处：《管理学报》2021年第10期1553-1561,共9页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71873026)。

摘　　要：针对双边平台的独占交易行为可能引发的反竞争效应,从平台与商家谈判博弈的角度出发,将独占交易行为按独家战略合作协议与强制性独占交易合约进行分类,探究平台实施独占交易行为的前提条件及产生的效应影响。研究发现:(1)在一定均衡条件下,平台提供非独占交易合约是对双方均有利的决策;(2)不同类型独占交易合约的签订取决于平台之间谈判能力的差异以及专有内容量的差异;(3)独家战略合作协议的签订不会对市场竞争造成负面影响,而强制性独占交易合约的签订会弱化横向平台间的市场竞争,限制纵向商家的归属并降低商家的利润。Aiming at the anti-competitive effect that may be caused by the exclusive trading behavior of bilateral platforms,this study classifies the exclusive trading behavior according to the exclusive strategic cooperation agreement and the mandatory exclusive trading agreement from the perspective of the negotiation game between platforms and merchants,and explores the preconditions and effects of the exclusive trading behavior.The research found that:The platform does not always provide exclusive strategic cooperation agreement or mandatory exclusive trading agreement.It is a favorable decision for both parties to provide non-exclusive trading agreement under a certain equilibrium condition.The signing of different types of exclusive transaction contracts depends on the difference of negotiation ability between platforms and the difference of exclusive capacity.The signing of exclusive strategic cooperation agreement will not have a negative impact on the market competition,while the signing of mandatory exclusive trade agreement will weaken the market competition among horizontal platforms,restrict the ownership of vertical merchants and reduce the profits of merchants.

关 键 词：双边市场 平台竞争 独家战略合作协议 强制性独占交易合约 反垄断 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]