连续并购对股价崩盘风险的影响研究  

Study on the Impact of Serial M&As on Stock Price Crash Risk

作　　者：庄明明 李善民[3] 梁权熙[4] ZHUANG Mingming;LI Shanmin;LIANG Quanxi(Guangdong University of Foreign Studies,Guangzhou,China;Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou,China;Guangxi University,Nanning,China)

机构地区：[1]广东外语外贸大学会计学院 [2]广东外语外贸大学跨国并购与创新战略研究中心 [3]中山大学管理学院 [4]广西大学商学院,南宁市530004

出　　处：《管理学报》2021年第7期1086-1094,共9页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71762005,71972057);广东省软科学资助重点项目(2020B1010010012)。

摘　　要：利用2006~2019年间A股上市公司的样本数据,考察了连续并购对公司股价崩盘风险的影响。研究发现,连续并购显著增加了公司未来股价发生崩盘的风险,并且公司内部的代理冲突对二者的关系具有强化作用。对作用渠道的研究发现,发生连续并购的公司通过延迟对坏消息的释放增加股价崩盘风险。进一步地,媒体关注度提升、聘任国际"四大"审计师或有境外机构投资者持股能够缓解二者的正向关系。此外,当连续并购中有异地并购或者多元化并购时,连续并购对股价崩盘风险的正向作用更强。Based on the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2006 to 2019,this paper investigates whether and how serial acquisitions affect the stock price crash risk.The results show that serial acquisitions increase the stock price crash risk significantly.The relationship between them is more pronounced in the companies with higher agency costs.Further evidence shows that companies with serial acquisitions are more inclined to implement opacity information disclosure policies to cover up the poor performance caused by serial acquisitions,thus increasing the stock price crash risk.In addition,the positive effect of serial acquisitions on stock price crash risk is stronger when there are diversified or strange land acquisitions in serial acquisitions.

关 键 词：连续并购 股价崩盘风险 公司治理 信息披露行为 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]