基于三方博弈模型的突发事件网络舆情政府干预时机分析  

Analysis on the Timing of Government Intervention in the Network Public Opinion in Emergencies Based on the Three-party Game Model

作　　者：冯兰萍[1,2] 钱春琳 庞庆华 程铁军[3] Feng Lanping

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,江苏常州213022 [2]常州工业大数据挖掘与知识管理重点实验室,江苏常州213022 [3]南京邮电大学经济学院,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《情报理论与实践》2021年第10期142-150,共9页Information Studies:Theory & Application

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目“多元舆论场共存背景下重大突发事件舆情博弈和引导策略研究”的成果,项目编号:17CXW012。

摘　　要：[目的/意义]探究突发事件网络舆情政府干预时机和应对措施,以期为该类研究提供新思路,为政府及相关部门有效应对突发事件提供借鉴。[方法/过程]详细阐述了研究问题和研究假设,引入政府干预延迟参数a,构建“政府—网民—关键节点”三方博弈演化模型,并分析该类舆情演化过程中三方博弈的过程和结果。通过仿真实验分析不同政府延迟干预程度下各主体策略的演化过程和结果。[结果/结论]结果显示,当a增加时,政府趋向于选择“干预”策略;面对网民和关键节点的不同策略组合,不同的政府延迟干预程度对政府干预意愿产生不同影响。最后,对政府干预突发事件网络舆情的时机和应对措施提供建议。[Purpose/significance]Based on network public opinions of emergencies,the timing and countermeasures for government intervention are explored,in order to provide new ideas for this kind of research and references for the government and relevant departments to effectively deal with emergencies.[Method/process]Firstly,the research problems and hypotheses are elaborated in detail.Then,the government intervention delay parameter a is introduced to build the three-party game evolution model of“government-netizen-key node”.The process and result of three-party game in the evolution of such public opinion are also analyzed.Finally,simulation experiments are conducted to analyze the evolution process and results of various strategies under different degrees of government delay intervention.[Result/conclusion]The results show that when a increases,the government tends to choose the intervention strategy.In the face of different strategy combinations of netizens and key nodes,different degrees of government delayed intervention have different influences on government intervention willingness.Finally,suggestions are provided on the timing and countermeasures for the government to intervene in the network public opinion of emergencies.

关 键 词：突发事件 网络舆情 政府干预 三方博弈 仿真分析 

分 类 号：C912.63[经济管理] D035[社会学] G206[政治法律—政治学]