区域合作污染控制及动态收益分配策略研究  

Research on Regional Cooperative Pollution Control and Dynamic Payment Distribution Strategy

作　　者：徐浩[1] 谭德庆[1] XU Hao;TAN De-qing(School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China)

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2021年第9期65-76,共12页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571149);四川石油天然气发展研究中心2021年度课题(SKB21-01)。

摘　　要：近年来,相邻区域之间的跨界污染问题层出不穷,并呈现交叉伤害的外溢性。在考虑污染容量动态变化的基础上,建立了非对称两区域之间的微分博弈模型,探讨在非合作机制、治污成本分担机制以及协同合作三种情形下双方的反馈纳什均衡策略、污染容量最优轨迹及瞬时收益的变化。在此基础上,进一步引入纳什议价方法分析了具有时间一致性的动态合作收益最优分配策略。结果表明,当污染对环境的伤害较大时,治污成本分担机制可以实现环境与经济的帕累托改善,而协同合作机制在区域收益与环境方面都是最优的;其次,通过数值分析探讨了地区的"短视"行为和环境自净率对稳定状态下均衡策略的影响,分析表明,地区的"短视"行为导致短期收益最大化,从而减少对治污的投入而增加了污染容量;而随着环境自净率的增加,污染容量与地区收益均有改善,但对环境伤害更为敏感的地区收益增加更显著。最后,给出了动态最优收益分配的具体数值变化。研究结论对区域之间治污模式与合作分配机制具有一定的决策参考价值。Transboundary pollution occurs when a potentially harmful environmental pollutant is released from one region and then migrates to another.Each region not only suffers from its own emissions damage,but also is affected by emissions from neighboring regions.The traditional mode of pollution control by considering local region has been difficult to effectively solve the current serious transboundary pollution problem,thus,the cooperative mechanism and cost-sharing mechanism have been introduced in this study.This paper focuses on the transboundary pollution control problem between a developed region and a developing region,the differences between the two regions are reflected in production capacity,abatement costs,and damage cost derived from pollution.Based on the above features,a differential game model between asymmetric regions has been built,where emissions are a by-product of production and accumulate into a harmful stock pollutant.The feedback Nash equilibrium,optimal trajectories of pollution stock and the change of instantaneous revenues are obtained under three scenarios consist of non-cooperative mechanism,pollution control cost-sharing mechanism and cooperative mechanism.Next,the Nash Bargaining solution is further introduced to analyze the optimal allocation strategy of dynamic cooperative payment with time-consistency.The results show that the pollution control cost-sharing mechanism can achieve Pareto improvement from the point of economy and environment when the environmental damages caused by the pollution are serious,while the cooperative mechanism is optimal in both regional revenues and environment.Secondly,the influences of"myopia"behaviors and environmental self-purification rate on equilibrium strategies in steady state are discussed through numerical analysis.The analysis shows that the"myopia"behavior of the regions leads to the maximization of short-term revenues,thus reducing the investment in pollution control and increases the pollution stock.With the increase of environmental self-puri

关 键 词：区域污染 非合作机制 治污成本分担 协同合作 动态收益分配 微分博弈 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]