国际粮食垄断资本与我国粮食安全  

International Grain Monopoly Capital and China’s Food Security

作　　者：程世勇[1] 刘旸[2] Cheng Shiyong;Liu Yang

机构地区：[1]首都师范大学管理学院 [2]中华女子学院思政部

出　　处：《江海学刊》2021年第5期248-253,255,共7页Jianghai Academic Journal

基　　金：国家社科基金项目“我国城市农民工相对多维贫困测度及治理研究”(项目号:20BZZ076);北京市社科基金项目“我国经济较发达地区农村宅基地三权分置改革研究”(项目号:18BJB002)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：在改革开放初期,以跨国粮商为代表的国际粮食垄断资本的净流入对弥补我国粮食市场头寸不足、资本缺失发挥了正向的互补效应。而当前我国经济进入高质量发展阶段,跨国粮商对粮食市场的垄断定价、资本并购、产业链控制已阻滞了我国粮食产业的优化升级,客观上正加剧我国粮食安全风险。要在双循环新发展格局下加快培育我国粮食资本,既不能选择美洲大农场型粮商模式,也不能选择欧洲中等农场型粮商模式,以东亚小农场为代表的粮食短缺国国际粮商模式应是国内粮商和粮食资本扩张的可行路径。因此,应通过有为政府与有效市场的双向互动培育和壮大国内多元化粮食资本,建设多层级粮食市场主体,推动藏粮于“地”、藏粮于“制”与藏粮于“技”内生化多维互动,实现我国粮食安全模式从被动型粮食安全向主动型粮食安全转变。In the early stage of reform and opening up, the net inflow of international grain monopoly capital played a positive complementary effect to make up for the food shortage of China. At present, China’s economy has entered the stage of high-quality development, the monopoly pricing, capital acquisition and industrial chain control of China’s grain market by transnational grain merchants have potentially blocked the optimization and upgrading of China’s grain industry. It will objectively aggravate the risk of China’s food security. Small farm patterns dominated in East Asia should be a feasible path for China’s grain industry. The two-way interaction between the government and the market would be the realistic choice to increase China’s grain capital stock and acceleration mechanism transformation of national food security.

关 键 词：粮食安全 国际垄断资本 跨国粮商 高质量发展 

分 类 号：F326.11[经济管理—产业经济]