基于目标责任制的中央政府与地方政府大气污染治理演化博弈研究  

The evolutionary game of air pollution control between central government and local governments:a research based on target responsibility system

作　　者：陈娟[1] 魏鹏 CHEN Juan;WEI Peng

机构地区：[1]中共江苏省委党校公共管理教研部,江苏南京210009

出　　处：《东南大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2021年第5期41-48,150,151,共10页Journal of Southeast University(Philosophy and Social Science)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“基于‘一带一路’资源场域绿色重构的我国传统制造业生态化转型研究”(71973023)成果之一。

摘　　要：目标责任制是我国大气污染治理中的重要制度安排,对打赢污染防治攻坚战具有重要作用。然而大气污染的治理过程较为复杂,其治理效果具有较大的不确定性。在此背景下,基于目标责任制的制度设计,引入外部因素变量的影响,通过演化博弈探究中央政府与地方政府在大气污染治理中的策略互动,将更符合现实情形。研究表明:外部因素显著影响地方政府大气污染治理的策略选择。对于外部因素有利的地区,适度的奖惩即可有效促进地方政府选择积极治理策略;而对于外部因素较不利的地区,加大监管和奖惩力度,将是更好的选择。The target responsibility system,an important institution in China’s air pollution control,plays a vital role in combating pollution.This paper studies how to reduce the uncertainties in air pollution control as it is known that the process demands hard effort.Based on the mechanism design of the target responsibility system,it firstly introduces the influence of external factors and then explores the interaction between central government and local governments in air pollution management through evolutionary game.The results show that external factors significantly influence the strategy of local governments.For regions with favorable external factors,moderate incentives can help local governments work out efficient strategies,while for regions without,it is a better choice to make more regulations,offer more incentives and reduce penalties.

关 键 词：大气污染治理 目标责任制 奖励水平 演化博弈 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学] X51[政治法律—中外政治制度]