高管机会主义品行与公司信息披露决策  

Executive Opportunism and Corporate Information Disclosure

作　　者：朱朝晖[1] 林雯 曾爱民[1] ZHU Zhaohui;LIN Wen;ZENG Aimin(School of Accounting,Zheijiang Gongshang University,Hangzhou 310018,China;School of Management,Hangzhou College of Commerce,Hangzhou 311508,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江工商大学会计学院,浙江杭州310018 [2]杭州商学院管理分院,浙江杭州311508

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2021年第8期40-54,共15页Journal of Business Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“宏观房价波动与微观企业股利政策--基于财务柔性理论视角的研究”(18YJA630004);国家社会科学基金重点项目“股票误定价的产生机制及对上市公司投资行为作用的机理研究”(13AGL002);浙江省自然科学基金一般项目“企业社会责任对股价崩盘风险影响机理研究”(LY15G020002);浙江省哲学社会科学规划课题“财务柔性、掠夺行为与企业价值”(14NDJC141YB)

摘　　要：文章构建相应策略识别了高管机会主义品行,并探究其对公司信息披露决策的影响。研究结果表明,高管的机会主义品行会显著增加公司信息披露违规、真实盈余管理行为;提升公司选择非国际"四大"会计师事务所的概率,并支付更高的审计费用。随着高管机会主义水平上升,公司更有可能作出上述决策。进一步地,国有产权能在一定程度上抑制高管机会主义品行对信息披露质量的负面影响,却显著增加了公司应计盈余管理;当高管机会主义水平较高时,国有产权也无法发挥有效治理作用。从经济后果看,高管的机会主义品行能被资本市场识别,并显著减损公司未来价值。This paper constructs strategies to identify the executive's characteristics of opportunism and explore its influence on corporate information disclosure.We find that the core opportunistic executives will significantly increase the probability of information disclosure violation and the level of real earnings management,and they are more likely to choose non-international"Big Four"accounting firms,and pay higher audit fees.The higher the level of opportunism,the more likely these behaviors are to be found.Further research shows that state-owned property rights can effectively restrain the influence of core opportunistic executives on information disclosure quality,but it prompts opportunistic executives to adopt more accrual earnings management strategies.The state-owned property rights are difficult to play an effective role as a constraint with the rising of the opportunism level.From the perspective of economic consequences,core opportunistic executives can be identified by the capital market,and significantly reduces the future value of the company.

关 键 词：高管品行 机会主义 信息披露违规 盈余管理 事务所选择 审计费用 

分 类 号：F234.4[经济管理—会计学]