基于演化博弈视角的开发商装配式建筑开发行为研究  

Study on the Development Behavior of Prefabricated Buildings of Real Estate Developers Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game

作　　者：李丹丹 方放 LI Dan-dan;FANG Fang(Xi'an Eurasia University)

机构地区：[1]西安欧亚学院

出　　处：《智能建筑与智慧城市》2021年第10期106-107,共2页Intelligent Building & Smart City

基　　金：西安欧亚学院重点课程建设项目:《房地产开发与经营》,项目编号:2018KC003。

摘　　要：装配式建筑绿色、环保、建造速度快,但也存在认可度低、开发商意愿不强等缺点。文章建立演化博弈模型,加入贴现因子和政策补贴两个要素进行仿真,构建开发商选择策略的动态行为模型,得出政府可通过加大补贴、降低增量成本的方式鼓励开发商行为,为推动装配式建筑的发展提供参考。Prefabricated buildings are green,environmentally friendly and fast in construction,but they also have shortcomings such as low recognition and weak willingness of developers.In this paper,an evolutionary game model is established,and two factors of discount factor and policy subsidy are added to simulate and conduct the dynamic behavior model of developers'choice strategy.It is concluded that the government can encourage developers'behavior by increasing subsidies and reducing incremental costs,which provides reference for promoting the development of prefabricated buildings.

关 键 词：装配式建筑 开发行为:演化博弈 

分 类 号：TU741[建筑科学—建筑技术科学]